A User Cooperation Stimulating Strategy Based on Cooperative Game Theory in Cooperative Relay Networks by unknown
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Volume 2009, Article ID 294942, 11 pages
doi:10.1155/2009/294942
Research Article
A User Cooperation Stimulating Strategy Based on
Cooperative Game Theory in Cooperative Relay Networks
Fan Jiang,1, 2 Hui Tian,1, 2 and Ping Zhang1, 2
1Key Laboratory of Universal Wireless Communications, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications,
Ministry of Education, Beijing 100876, China
2Wireless Technology Innovation Institute, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications,
Beijing 100876, China
Correspondence should be addressed to Fan Jiang, fjiangwbc@gmail.com
Received 31 January 2009; Revised 8 June 2009; Accepted 16 August 2009
Recommended by Gabor Fodor
This paper proposes a user cooperation stimulating strategy among rational users. The strategy is based on cooperative game
theory and enacted in the context of cooperative relay networks. Using the pricing-based mechanism, the system is modeled
initially with two nodes and a Base Station (BS). Within this framework, each node is treated as a rational decision maker. To this
end, each node can decide whether to cooperate and how to cooperate. Cooperative game theory assists in providing an optimal
system utility and provides fairness among users. Under diﬀerent cooperative forwarding modes, certain questions are carefully
investigated, including “what is each node’s best reaction to maximize its utility?” and “what is the optimal reimbursement to
encourage cooperation?” Simulation results show that the nodes benefit from the proposed cooperation stimulating strategy in
terms of utility and thus justify the fairness between each user.
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1. Introduction
Cooperative diversity [1, 2] has been widely proposed for
applications in wireless networks. In a wireless network
consists of a collection of nodes, each having a single
antenna, cooperative diversity assists to enlarge system cover-
age and increase link reliability. Cooperative diversity works
by having the network nodes assist in data transmission,
thus achieving a virtual antenna array. This occurs through
having a number of nodes to transmit redundant signals
over diﬀerent paths, which allows the destination terminal
to receive average channel variations.
The benefits of cooperative diversity are highly desirable
for those wireless applications in which the chief concerns
are bandwidth and energy. However, while it is realistic to
assume cooperation under some circumstances, in commer-
cial applications, there is no reason for assuming that the
network nodes will cooperate unselfishly. In fact, given that
nodes are independent entities and that random cooperative
acts will expend their resources, nodes are necessarily selfish.
In other words, nodes consume their resources solely to
maximize their benefits. There is no apparent benefit in a
user forwarding data for other nodes. At the same time,
however, the node would also prefer to have other nodes
forward its own data.
In such a situation, a game theoretic approach can be
used to model the network and to guide the interactions
between rational decision-makers. In [3], a cooperation
strategy based on the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) was
proposed to solve two basic problems, specifically when to
cooperate and how to cooperate. The authors first present
a symmetric system model comprising of two users and
an access point (AP). With reference to cooperative game
theory, and based on the Nash bargaining solution, a coop-
eration bandwidth allocation strategy is then proposed. In
[4], a pricing algorithm was presented for multihop wireless
networks that encourage forwarding among autonomous
nodes via reimbursement. In [5], a power-aware reputation
system to stimulate cooperation on power-aware routing
was formulated for ad hoc networks and to help each
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node determine its cooperation willingness from its own
reputation. Based on the results given in [6], [7] presented
a pricing game for stimulating cooperative diversity among
selfish nodes in a commercial wireless ad hoc network.
The work in [8] then reviewed this research and oﬀered
an evaluation of the various game theoretic approaches
for stimulating cooperation. Essentially, this illustrated the
sensitivity of the game theoretic approach to the choice of
utility functions.
In the context of cooperative relay network, one user
might individually select its best relay user and form
a request for cooperation. Nevertheless, considering the
random arrival position and the mobile nature of each user,
the mobile terminal which initiates cooperative transmission
in turn may not be the optimal forwarding candidate for
the relay. To this end, the concept of using pricing to foster
cooperation among users is arguably more appropriate than
to having users cooperatively relaying data for each other
as described in [3]. With gains obtained from cooperation,
the relay can either select other appropriate nodes for
cooperation or can choose to transmit directly. However,
when it comes to pricing-based schemes, a noncooperative
game theory is often used as a starting point. This is shown by
researchers contributing to [4–8]. The main disadvantage of
these works is that they concentrate on individual user utility,
rather than utility of the entire system. By contrast, based
on cooperative game theory, the scheme proposed in [3] can
achieve general Pareto optimal performance for cooperative
games. This will help in maximizing an entire system payoﬀ,
while also ensuring fairness.
Stimulated by the aforementioned research, this paper
proposes a pricing and utility framework for stimulating
cooperation among users. Diﬀerent from previous pricing-
based research results, the proposed framework consisting of
an asymmetric model of two nodes and a Base Station (BS),
as provided by cooperative game theory. In this framework,
each node, namely, the source and the relay, is treated as
rational and with its own choice of whether, and how to
cooperate. Moreover, the “asymmetric” is characterized as
the source having a chance to get the relay’s help, and
with the payoﬀ being a remuneration; while the relay will
cooperatively forward to the BS, the data which originated
from the source then gains reimbursement from the source.
To provide an optimal system utility while keeping fairness
among users, the Nash Bargaining Solution is used to address
the following questions: “What is each node’s best reaction
to maximize its utility?” and “What is the appropriate
reimbursement the source should pay so as to encourage
cooperation as well as maintain fairness?” Using two diﬀerent
cooperative forwarding modes, specifically, Amplify-and-
Forward (AF) and Decode-and-Forward (DF) cooperation,
the analysis for this study is then verified by extensive
computer simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the system model, and Section 3 defines the utility
functions used in this paper. Section 4 proposes a scheme
based on cooperative game theory for helping the source
to determine its optimal level of reimbursement. Based on
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Figure 1: System model.
its best reaction according to the reimbursement. Section 5
presents simulation results to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness
of the proposed scheme. Section 6 discusses some related
implementation issues, and the conclusion is provided in
Section 7.
2. System Model
In the considered framework, a set of users consist of the
nodes in the network. Each node can perform a set of
actions: for example, transmit its data to the BS directly, have
another node cooperatively forward its data, not forward
for other node at all, or forward only a fraction of other
node’s data. To represent a user’s payoﬀ over a set of
action profiles precisely, the term “utility” is exploited here
according to the game theory. Moreover, for the sake of
stimulating cooperative behavior between nodes, pricing
mechanism is introduced. As shown in Figure 1, a pricing-
based asymmetric relay model is considered. This model
includes two users (nodes) and one BS. Both nodes assume
the BS as the final destination, while the BS charges each
transmitting node the common unit price of λ. We suppose
an interference free model where user transmissions are
considered as orthogonal to each other. Assume that the
system is based on frequency division multiple access and
each node is allocated a W hertz bandwidth for transmitting
its own packets. As illustrated in Figure 1, if a source wants
its potential relay to cooperatively transmit m (m ∈ [0, 1])
as a fraction of its own data to the BS, the relay must
be compensated via a unit reimbursement price of μ for
forwarding. As far as relay is concerned, to maximize its
utility, it is only willing to use n fraction (n ∈ [0, 1]) of its
bandwidth to relay an n fraction of the data that has origins
from the source. The remaining 1−m fraction of the source’s
data as well as the 1 − n fraction of the relay’s data will be
transmitted directly to the BS.
In this model, the relay might choose to use AF or DF
cooperation methods for forwarding the source’s data to the
BS and consequently gains remuneration from the source.
Thus, the diversity gain of the source heavily depends on
how much fraction data is devoted by the relay to cooperative
transmission. By contrast, the relay revenue actually depends
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on how much the source is willing to pay. Given there are
no neutrals to monitor “cheating” behaviors between selfish
nodes and the assumption of rational behavior for each node;
then the pricing rule is readily be violated by the participants.
For instance, the source may require the relay to forward its
data first and then compensates no reimbursement for the
relay. Alternately, the relay may require the source to prepay
but not forward any of its data at all.
We address this problem with a dynamic cooperative
game model. In this model, given certain constraints, each
node will determine on its own strategy in a sequenced,
yet nonsimultaneous manner. For instance, when wanting to
benefit from cooperation, the source has to first select a best
fraction of data m as well as an appropriate reimbursement
price of μ to reward the relay. On the other hand, in order
to maximize its utility, the relay will independently decide
how much fraction of the data to transmit that originates
from the source. Note that through selecting an optimal
value of m and μ, the source also aims at maximizing its
own utility. Furthermore, the payment λ charged by the BS
remains constant during the interaction between the source
and the relay.
From the aforementioned description, it can be inferred
that the variables m, n, and μ reflect the rational decisions
made by the each node, and that one participant’s strat-
egy will undoubtedly aﬀect the choice of the other user.
Intuitively, both nodes can expect optimal tradeoﬀs between
their payout and payoﬀ, and the choice of cooperation
thus heavily depends on whether the cooperative behavior
will bring maximum individual utility. In order to model
the complicated interaction between each participant, we
will first address this issue from the aspect of utility
function. Followed by the well-designed utility functions,
the remaining section presents a suitable solution for the
framework described above and one which also invites a
win-win situation. Besides, to clarify the analysis, some
parameters are formally defined. These notations will be
helpful to analytically obtain each user’s payoﬀ:
(i) λ: per unit price the BS charges for data transmission;
(ii) μ: the source reimbursement price per unit data;
(iii) m: fraction of data requested by the source for
cooperative transmission;
(iv) n: fraction of data forwarded by the relay;
(v) W : bandwidth for transmission.
3. Utility Functions
To appropriately denote a user’s preferences over a set of
action profiles, a good representative approximation is indis-
pensible. Here, the concept of utility function is adopted.
The utility function, which maps a set of action alternatives
into real numbers, is used to properly represent the payoﬀ
of each node. Thereupon, how to define a meaningful
and delicate utility function for the proposed model is an
essential problem. As stated in [9], cooperative diversity is
a physical layer protocol that aﬀects physical layer variables.
In particular, the two variables of interest are throughput
achieved and transmission power consumed. In the game
theoretic model, the utility measures of the system need to
incorporate these two parameters into a reasonable fashion.
That is to say, for equal power, higher throughput should
translate into higher utility. Similarly, for equal throughput,
lower power should bring increased utility. According to the
research results presented in [10], a user’s utility is measured










In this function, utility U(p) is proportional to through-
put T(p) and inversely proportional to power p. The
utility is interpreted as the number of information bits
received per joule of energy consumed. Specifically, suppose
that the source and the relay both have a utility function
denoted by formula (1) for transmission; the choice of
cooperation thus depends on the utility achieved. If utility
gained from cooperation is higher than utility achieved by
noncooperation, then the node should choose to cooperate.
However, the cooperating utility is only acquired when both
nodes choose to cooperate. If only one of the two nodes is
cooperating, then the cooperating node obviously does not
achieve a cooperating utility.
In the proposed pricing-based game theoretic model, the
BS always charges the users for service based on throughput.
To maximize its utility, the source first selects an optimal
fraction of data to be cooperatively transmitted by the
relay and also provides a certain reimbursement price as
an incentive for forwarding. Then, the source derives utility
from this by the increased throughput it achieves with
comparatively less power. Meanwhile, the relay gains utility
from the payment made to it by the source. The interaction
between the source and the relay includes the following.
(1) The source optimizes m and μ to maximize its utility
using the following sequence.
(i) Source and relay interact in cooperative game to
determine forwarding preferences.
(ii) Source adaptively sets the value of m as well as
μ.
(iii) Source calculates its utility.
(2) The relay optimizes n to maximize its utility using the
following sequence.
(i) Relay dynamically sets the value of n.
(ii) Relay calculates its revenue.
Each node has a set of preferences, modeled by its
utility, which should take into account the amount of data it
transfers and the consequent price it pays. The best response
function is how the node will behave, assuming that it acts
in self-interest. Consequently, the utility functions adopted
in the proposed framework should not only incorporate the
parameters such as throughput and power but also embody
each node’s preferences, for instance, the choice of m, n,
and μ. Combined with the pricing-based algorithm described
4 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
in [4–9, 11], the utility functions in this paper for the source























































Equation (2) stands for the utility obtained by the source
through cooperative transmission while the formula (3)
actually represents the corresponding payoﬀ of the relay.
Depending on user’s role (relay or source), the utility
functions comprise of two parts. The direct transmission part
accounts for the satisfaction received in transmitting data
and the associated BS charges. The cooperative transmission
part accommodates both actual and opportunity costs of
forwarding data along with the respective pricing rewards.
More specially, in the case of cooperation, the source utility
is the satisfaction measure achieved where cooperation
subtracts the total price paid to the BS and the relay. While
the relay utility under cooperation is simply the total revenue
it earns from the source subtracts the total price it pays to
the BS. Here, variables ps and pr represent the transmission
power of the source as well as the relay, respectively. f (γ)
which is also called the eﬃciency function, denotes the





) = [1− 2BER(γ)]M. (4)
With frames of M bits, BER is the bit error rate and γ
denotes the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). The BER,
for noncoherent frequency shift keyed (FSK) transmission,











; γ = hp
N0W
, (5)
where p is the transmit power, N0W is the noise power, and
h is the channel path gain. According to [10], h is calculated
as h = (7.75 × 10−3)/d3.6, d being the distance between the
transmitter and the receiver in meters. Back to (2) and (3),
γsb and γrb stand respectively, for the SNR of the channel
from the source to the BS as well as from the relay to the
BS. Here γct represents the eﬀective SNR which is achieved
by the source through cooperative transmission. According
to diﬀerent cooperative forwarding methods, the expression
of γct diﬀers for AF cooperation by the relay and is given as
follows [12]:
γAFct = γsb +
γsrγrb
1 + γsr + γrb
. (6)
γsr denotes the SNR of the wireless channels from the
source to the relay, whereas a case of DF cooperation by the
relay, is represented as [13, 14]
γDFct = min
{
γsr, γsb + γrb
}
. (7)
Based on the system model presented in Section 2, the
proposed utility functions in (2) and (3) are executed by
each node as follows: firstly, the BS periodically broadcasts
current value of λ, and each node constructs its utility
function individually according to the role it plays. By
obtaining the information of γsb and γct, the source will
decide whether to adopt cooperative transmission. If utility
gained from cooperation is greater than utility achieved by
noncooperation, the source adaptively chooses the optimal
value of m and μ to maximize its payoﬀ. The source then
sends m fraction of its data to the relay along with the
information of reimbursement price μ and waits for reply.
Once the relay receives this data request, by combining it
with the value of λ, it will independently derive the optimal
value of n from (3). By listening to the acknowledgment sent
by the BS, the source finally calculates its utility according
to formula (2) and further adjusts the value of m and μ if
necessary. The interaction between the source and the relay
continues and eventually converges at the equilibrium point.
It is worth noting that in the case of cooperation, the
variables m and n which represent the respective cooperating
preferences for the source and the relay are subjected to the
following constraints:
0 ≤ m ≤ 1,
0 ≤ n ≤ m.
(8)
The above condition can be interpreted as follows: firstly,
for the source which requests the relay to cooperatively
transmit m fraction of its data to the BS, then m should
be no larger than one. On the other hand, a relay can, at
most, forward the same amount of data originating from the
source. Finally, to create a meaningful cooperative scheme,
both m and n should be nonnegative.
4. Cooperative Game Approaches
In this section, cooperative game theory is used to analyze the
problem outlined in Section 3. First we will briefly introduce
the concepts of bargaining problem and the related solution
methods. Then, based on the NBS, a cooperative scheme is
presented in detail which outlines the best policy for each
node to maximize its utility.
4.1. Basic Concepts and Theorems. The bargaining problem
of cooperative game theory can be described as follows
[15, 16]: assume that there are K players, with Ui, i =
1, . . . ,K , representing the minimum payoﬀ that the ith player
would expect or the disagreement point when K players do
not agree on a compromise. Let S ⊆ RK be a nonempty
convex and closed set representing the feasible set of payoﬀ
allocations for players if they work together. Assume that
{Ui ∈ S | Ui > Ui,∀i ∈ K} is a nonempty, closed, and
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convex set. Let U = {U1,U2, . . . ,UK}, then the pair (S, U)
is called a K-person bargaining problem [17]. Within the
feasible set S, we now define the notion of Pareto optimal
concept as representing selection criterion for bargaining
solutions.
Definition 1. The point (U1, . . . ,UK ) is said to be Pareto
optimal if and only if there is no other allocation U ′i such
that U ′i > Ui, for all i ∈ K .
Pareto optimality is also called Pareto eﬃcient, which
means that it is impossible to find another point which leads
to superior performance for all players. In general, for a K-
person bargaining game, there might be an infinite number
of Pareto optimal points [15]. To select the optimal point,
additional criteria are needed. Such criteria are the so-called
fairness axioms, these characterizing the Nash Bargaining
Solution. The NBS is briefly explained as follows.
Definition 2. σ is said to be a NBS in set S (S ⊆ RK ), such
that σ = f (S, U) if the following four axioms are satisfied:
(1) Pareto Optimality. There does not exist (S1, S2) ∈ S, such
that (S1, S2) > f (S, U).
(2) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If σ ∈ S′ ⊂ S,
σ = f (S, U), then σ = f (S′, U).
(3) Independence of Linear Transformations. For any linear
scale transformation ξ, ξ( f (S, U)) = f (ξ(S), ξ(U)).
(4) Symmetry. If U is invariant under all exchanges of
agents, then f1(S, U) = f2(S, U).
Nash demonstrated a unique solution function for a K-
player bargaining problem and one which satisfies all the
above four axioms. The solution is explicated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. Existence and Uniqueness of NBS (Nash’s Theo-
rem). There is a unique solution function f (S, U) that satisfies
all four axioms, and this solution satisfies








The Nash solution selects the allocation that maximizes
the product of the expected gains, this known as the Nash
product.
4.2. A Cooperative Scheme. As discussed above, the coopera-
tive game in the cooperative relay networks can be defined as
follows. According to each user’s role, each node has Ui(pi)
(i = s, r, where s indicates the source and r denotes the relay)
as its objective function. This is written in formulas (2) and
(3), where Ui(pi) is bounded above and has a nonempty,
closed, and convex support. The goal is to maximize all
Ui(pi) simultaneously, and Ui(pi), also called the initial
agreement point, represents the minimal performance. The
problem, then, is to find an optimal operating point that
maximizes the utility for all users and ensure that the point
is optimal and fair.
With the help of NBS, for the problem mentioned above,
the NBS function is expressed as

















where Us(ps) =W(1/ps − λ) f (γsb) and Ur(pr) =W(1/pr −
λ) f (γrb) denote the utility of the source under the conditions
of direct transmission as well as denote the relay. More
specially, in the case of noncooperation, the source and
relay utility are simply the satisfaction measure achieved by
subtracting the total price paid to the BS. From the properties
of NBS functions, it can be concluded that a node will
choose to quit cooperate, if the utility obtained through the
cooperative transmission is smaller than the utility obtained
through a direct transmission. In other words, since each
node is a rational decision-maker with independent choice, it
will only choose to transmit cooperatively if the performance
is better than that of direct transmission.
































































For simplicity, we keep the variables pi, i = s, r, and W
to be constant. Moreover, since Ui(pi), i = s, r, represents
the minimal utility the user can obtain through direct
transmission, it should follow that Ui(pi) ≥ 0. Consequently,
we can infer that λ ≤ 1/pi, this providing the constraint of
the charge provided by the BS.
The next object is to determine the optimal value of m, n
and an appropriate reimbursement price for μ.
Assuming A = (1/ps − λ) f (γct), B = (1/ps − λ) f (γsb) +
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From the above relations, it can be derived that
m = DX + AY
AC − BD ,
n = CX + BY
AC − BD .
(14)
Since the parameter W represents the bandwidth allo-
cated to each node for transmission which remains constant,
recalling the NBS function given in (9), our main target then
lies in to find the optimal value of m, n, and μ that maximize
the product of XY .
Assume AC − BD > 0 and that by substituting (14) into
(8), we now have
0 ≤ DX + AY ≤ AC − BD,
0 ≤ CX + BY ≤ (AC − BD)m.
(15)
The relationships derived in (13) are also depicted in
Figure 2, where the four dash-dot lines stand for the four
constraints. The shaded region represents the set of points
(X ,Y) that satisfy the restrictions of (15). After this, we need
to find the exact maximization point for the product of XY .
To maintain the fairness among nodes, the condition
for solving the equation derived in (13) is to assume that
(Us(ps) − Us(ps)) = (Ur(pr) − Ur(pr)). This essentially
means that the expected payoﬀ of each node is the same after
cooperation. This assumption can be explained as follows.
Firstly, to maximize its payoﬀ, the source will choose an
optimal value of m as well as an appropriate value of μ. If
cooperative transmission is more advantageous compared
with direct transmission, then the source will undoubtedly
perform the following actions: to have the relay transmit as
much fraction of its data as possible, and at the same time to
cut oﬀ its payout. This essentially means that the best policy
for the source is to increase the value of m and to decrease
the value of μ.
On the other hand, with the knowledge of the values of λ
and μ, the relay calculates the expected payoﬀ. It then decides
on its own strategy, which is a typical two person bargaining
problem. Under the circumstances that the cooperation can
bring more payoﬀ than a noncooperation case, the best
course of action for the relay in response to the source’s
choice is equally to maximize its own revenue and, at the
same time, to cut down expense paid to the BS. This indicates
that its best policy is to decrease the value of n as less as
possible.
Unfortunately, without an impartial third party to avoid
the selfish behavior of each node, it is hard to arrive at a
balancing solution that insures maximum utilities of both
nodes as well as fairness. Alternatively, with the restriction
to have both nodes receive the same expected payoﬀ, if one
node chooses to adopt a diﬀerent strategy, it will definitely
harm another node’s payoﬀ. Under cooperative game theory,
this is also explained as a necessary commitment from each
participant [16]. In other words, this condition strikes a
balance between the two participants, in that it is impossible
to make any individual improvement unless at least some
other participants are worse oﬀ, which gives the definition
of Pareto optimal.
Under the above considerations, we now have X = Y .
From the definition of variables A, B, C, and D, it can be
inferred that all of them are nonnegative. WhenAC−BD > 0,
it yields 0 ≤ X = Y ≤ AC − BD/A + D, which can be
interpreted as follows: if cooperative transmission is adopted,
both nodes can improve their payoﬀ compared with direct
transmission; otherwise both nodes will choose to cease
the cooperation. According to the constraint inequality, if
Xmax = Ymax = AC − BD/A + D, it is easy to derive that
the coordinate product XY is maximized. Consequently, the
corresponding data allocation scheme is equivalent to
m = 1,




Equation (16) provides a solution to the bargain problem
depicted in expression (9). It can be explained that: when
adopting a cooperation strategy, in order for the source node
to maximize utility, the best strategy is to set m = 1. This
allows the relay to cooperatively transmit all its data to the
destination. Consequently, it is derived that n = B+C/A+D.
The next challenge is to resolve the appropriate value of μ
that maximizes the payoﬀ on both sides. Since the relay will
only forward the data originated from the source, there are




AC − BD > 0.
(17)
























































































































































The possible value range of μ is illustrated in inequalities
(19). When adopting cooperation, the best strategy for
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(−B/AC − BD,C/AC − BD)
(0,AC − BD/A)
(D − C)X + (A− B)Y = 0
(A− B,C −D)
(AC − BD/D, 0)
DX + AY = AC − BD
DX + AY = 0
CX + BY = 0
Figure 2: Points (X ,Y) that satisfy the restrictions when AC − BD > 0.
the source is to inspire the relay transmitting for the same
fraction of the data required by the source. This yields



























Through the obtainable μ∗ in function (20), the relay will
receive the greatest reward and the source will get maximum
benefit from cooperative diversity; therefore the maximum
payoﬀ of both participants can be achieved. Consequently,
when n = m, we now have (Xmax,Ymax) = (A−B,C−D). This
corresponds to the point shown in Figure 2 in which the line
depicted by DX + AY = AC − BD intersects with the line
depicted by DX + AY = CX + BY .
Alternatively, if AC − BD ≤ 0, then the maximization
problem described in expression (9) appropriates all the
utilities greater than those of the noncooperation case.
Essentially, this means that both X and Y are greater than
zero. Moreover, when substituting the expression in terms of
X , Y into the restriction given in (8), it can be derived that
the only possible results derived is n = m = 0. This results
in (Xmax,Ymax) = (0, 0). This situation can be interpreted as
follows: when cooperation does not provide greater payoﬀ
for the nodes involved, they will consequently cease the
cooperation. Given the payment if other variables remain
constant, the value of AC−BD, which is closely related to the
channel quality and the payment, is a critical requirement for
cooperation. When AC − BD is below zero, both nodes will
choose to transmit directly. However, as long as AC − BD is
above zero, to transmit cooperatively is obviously superior to
other strategies. The shift in condition from noncooperation
to cooperation will occur when AC − BD is equal to zero.
Accordingly, there must be a sudden change in the amount
of m, n, and μ, from zero to a certain positive value which is






















































































It should be noted that the left-side expression in
inequalities (21) is the direct result of AC − BD > 0 in
the form of μ, which should be greater than zero. As a
result, the above expressions (21) are derived to clarify the
circumstances under which two nodes should cooperate.
5. Simulation Results
The simulation scenario we adopted is similar to the model
described in [3]. Consider a network composed of three
nodes. A BS is located in the origin and the source is situated
800 meters far from the BS in the x-axis, the coordinates
of the source being given as (800,0). When the relay moves
along the x-axis toward the source, then coordinates are
(ds, 0). The value of ds varies from 400 meters to 1400 meters.
Other parameters used in the simulation include M = 80,
BER(γ) = (1/2) exp(−γ/2), W = 106 Hz, and N0W =
5× 10−15 W. The transmitting power is assumed to be 0.1 W
for both nodes, and the unit price of λ charged by BS is
assumed to be 0.1.
Using the source and the relay utility functions described
in (2) and (3), we plot the source utility and the relay utility
for varying relay to BS distances.
Figures 3 and 4 show each node’s utility in the case of
cooperation, respectively, for AF or DF forwarding as well as
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Figure 4: User utilities with the proposed strategy under DF
forwarding.
in the case of direct transmission. As can be observed, when
the distance between the source and the relay is below 600,
neither node cooperates, and the utility values therefore
converge to the noncooperation ones. However, as the relay
is approaching the source, or more specifically, when ds =
640 m, then both nodes start to cooperate. Owing to the
relay’s good channel condition, both nodes, via cooperation,
will improve their revenue. This occurs when the source
receives diversity gain by cooperative transmission, whereas
the relay receives a deserved reimbursement from the source.
Notice that for all nodes, the cooperating utility outstrips
the noncooperating utility by a wide margin. This is the
original framework we set forth, and one which underlies
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Relay to BS distance (m)
AF μ = 1
AF μ = 2
AF μ = 3
AF μ = 4
AF μ = 5
AF μ = 6
AF μ = 7
AF μ = 8
AF μ = μ∗
6.0026e + 012
Figure 5: Value of (Us(ps) − Us(ps))(Ur(pr) − Ur(pr)) versus
diﬀerent locations of the relay under AF forwarding.
This is achieved by adopting proper cooperation. It is also
worth noting that the source utility under cooperation
is close to that of the relay, this being due to the fact
that our strategy is aimed at maintaining fairness among
each user. In itself, and compared with traditional pricing-
based schemes which only maximize the source’s utility,
this is a distinctive characteristic. Subsequently, we arrive
at an optimal source reimbursement price, and one which
maximizes a participant’s utility without hindering another
user’s payoﬀ. Furthermore, our results are obtained when the
reimbursement price μ is equal to μ∗. It is hard to tell from
these two figures whether the value of μ is optimal, and we
address this problem in Figures 5 and 6.
Figures 5 and 6 display the product of (Us(ps) −
Us(ps))(Ur(pr) − Ur(pr)) for the resulting diﬀerent values
of μ when the relay adopts AF or DF forwarding. To
demonstrate the distinct advantage of the proposed strategy,
we also plot the situation when μ is equal to a constant
value. These figures show that when cooperation happens,∏
i=s,r(Ui(pi) − Ui(pi)) is maximized only when μ equals to
the optimal value μ∗. This is because the reimbursement
price that is paid by the source to the relay is determined
variously, by the channel quality between the source and
the relay. It is also determined variously between the relay
and the BS. With these dynamic values for μ, the relay node
will receive a deserved reward if it honestly participates in
cooperation. Furthermore, the source also reaps cooperative
diversity, thereby producing the revenue maximization for
both nodes. However, if the source chooses a small constant
value of μ, as the channel condition between them becomes
better, the source will gain more than the relay. As a
consequence, in order to increase its revenue, the best
reaction for the relay is to forward a smaller fraction of data
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Figure 6: Value of (Us(ps) − Us(ps))(Ur(pr) − Ur(pr)) versus
diﬀerent locations of the relay under DF forwarding.
required by the source. This will lead to diminishment in the
product value. On the other hand, if the source adopts a large
constant value of μ, it will lose more than it gains. When
the relay is moving toward the source, in the region roughly
between 600 m and 1200 m,
∏
i=s,r(Ui(pi)−Ui(pi)) becomes
positive. In other words, the cooperation brings advantages
for each user. However, when ds > 1200 m,
∏
i=s,r(Ui(pi) −
Ui(pi)) is almost zero. In this application, whether users
cooperate or not will bring no further benefits. This suggests
that the source should consider selecting another optimal
relay. Moreover, when the relay adopts diﬀerent forwarding
scheme, that is, AF or DF, the results in terms of utilities also
diﬀer slightly as depicted in the figures.
Figure 7 illustrates the changing values of μ. When ds <
640 m, each node transmits directly, this being denoted by
μ = 0. Users start to cooperate when ds = 640 m, which
can be interpreted as the point when the channel quality is
good enough for cooperation, and the source is willing to
pay (the relay) an appropriate reward for forwarding data
to the BS. However, when the relay is gradually far from
the BS, and as its channel condition becomes worse little
by little, the source will decrease the reimbursement price
accordingly. It is worth noting that when the relay is very far
from the BS, that is, ds > 1200 m, the result is equivalent
to a noncooperation case even though the source can still
choose cooperative transmission. Again, it can be observed
that there is a slight diﬀerence between the AF forwarding
and the DF forwarding schemes.
Figures 8 and 9 show the system’s sum utility of the AF
and DF cooperation. In the context of cooperation, it can be
observed that when the relay moves across the cooperation
starting point of ds = 640 m, there is a sudden change in
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Figure 8: Sum utility of the cooperative system under AF forward-
ing.
previous analysis. Besides, it should also be noted that for all
the candidate values of μ, the cooperating utility is greater
than that of the noncooperation case. Moreover, the system’s
sum utility is maximized when the optimal reward value μ∗
is adopted. As such, the advantage is gradually diminished
when the relay moves far from the BS.
Figures 10 and 11 plot the fraction of data that each user
has dedicated for the cooperation. Regardless of whether the
relay adopts the AF or DF forwarding scheme, when the
source chooses a small constant reimbursement price value,
then, the relay forwards only a fraction of the data required
by the source. On the other hand, and according to the
Nash bargaining solution, when the optimal reward value
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Figure 10: Fraction of cooperation data versus diﬀerent locations
of the relay under AF forwarding.
μ∗ is employed, the best relay strategy involves forwarding
the same fraction of data originated from the source. This
leads to the maximized utilities of both nodes. By utilizing
the dynamic value of μ, both nodes win from cooperation,
and at the same time the fairness among each participant is
also guaranteed.
6. Implementation Issues
Concerning the implementation, it is obvious that the pro-
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Figure 11: Fraction of cooperation data versus diﬀerent locations
of the relay under DF forwarding.
In current researched relay-based cellular networks, when
referring to the typical two user cooperation scenarios, most
academic papers assumed that once the selection pair is
achieved, the selected relay will unconditionally forward
data for the other user. Actually, when a mobile is helping
a neighbor mobile by forwarding data, it is sacrificing its
throughput for the sake of another one, and such behavior
has to be taken into consideration when the average user
throughput is calculated. In other words, the selected relay
sacrifices its throughput without any incentives basis, which
is not going to happen in the commercial cellular networks.
The strategy presented in this paper is aimed to address
this problem by way of stimulating cooperative behavior.
Through signaling channels, when a mobile wants to deploy
cooperation with another mobile, it can independently
construct its utility function and calculate the optimal
fraction of data to be sent cooperatively by the relay as
well as the appropriate reimbursement price. On the other
hand, the relay can also adaptively decide how much fraction
of the data to transmit that originates from the source so
as to maximize its utility. This is achieved by utilizing the
proposed algorithm to maximize both participants’ revenue
as well as to maintain fairness.
7. Conclusion
This paper presents a user cooperation stimulating strategy
based on cooperative game theory in the context of a coop-
erative relay network. Using a pricing-based mechanism, an
asymmetric model is comprehensively discussed, consisting
of two nodes and a BS. In this framework, each node is
treated as a rational decision-maker, determining its own
choice of whether, to cooperate and how. In order to provide
an optimal system utility while keeping fairness among
users, we turn to cooperative game theory. Under diﬀerent
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking 11
cooperative forwarding modes, the questions “what is each
node’s best reaction to maximize its utility?” and “what is
the appropriate reimbursement the source should pay to
encourage cooperation?” have been systematically addressed.
Finally, simulation results demonstrate the benefit that the
nodes derive from the proposed strategy in terms of utility,
and the fairness among each user is guaranteed.
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